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Abstract
The new residential property price in Hong Kong has rocketed in the last decade and has 
ranked within the top three metropolitan cities in the world. Housing is a necessity for most 
people, high residential property price has its social ramification. The rocketing price seems 
not solely the result of the market. As such, this raised the issue of competition in this market. 
This study employs Concentration Ratio and Hirfindahl-Hirschman index to evaluate the 
market concentration of the New Private Resident Units Market in Hong Kong. Using the best 
information available in the public domains and applying universal thresholds, the New Private 
Resident Units Market in Hong Kong is considered moderately concentrated. It is noted that 
the big five listed developers in Hong Kong are collectively holding a dominant position of the 
potential supply. Moreover, the top three have comparable market shares thus suggesting 
no monopoly exists. It is also found that the substantial land banks held by the five big listed 
developers, amount to 60% of that owned by the Government. These developers will therefore 
retain their dominant market power in the future. Further study is recommended to examine 
whether the big developers have abused their market power.
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1
Introduction
The rise or fall of the property price is often used as thermometer of an economy. In recent years, 
the extra low interest rate resulted from the quantitative easing practiced in many countries has 
held the cost of borrowing at a record low. This inevitably has led to an upsurge of asset values. 
Real estate property is one of the mostly affected markets. In 2014, among the top five countries 
with a strong surge in property price, Hong Kong held the front position with 16.43 per cent 
of price growth in that year (Anderson, 2015). Housing is a necessity for most people, therefore 
high residential property prices have immense social ramifications. In fact, unaffordable property 
prices have been identified as one of the major causes of social discontent.
The average residential property price increased by 63% from July 2003 to May 2005 (Poon, 
2011). While the market price slightly took a dip in 2008, by 2009 the cost for purchasing 
residential properties still ranked 4th among all the international metropolitan cities (Poon, 
2011). Figure 1 gives the price index provided by the Hong Kong Rating and Valuation 
Department, which demonstrates the trend of property prices in Hong Kong from 1997 
to 2015. The residential property prices in Hong Kong have risen 117.2% from December 
2008 to December 2012. The trend of property price continues and at a rate far exceeded 
inflation during the period of 2012 to 2015. Similarly, the growth of property price of an 
average residential unit in the United Kingdom rose by 9.2% just in 2015, a rise that cannot be 
explained solely by the inflation factor (Cordell, 2016).
Hong Kong’s government has attempted to suppress the rise of housing price rises since 2010. 
The measures are summarised as follows (Delmendo, 2016; Hong Kong ISD, 2016):
A:  In November 2010, the government imposed a “flip tax” of 15% on property resold within 
six months, and doubled stamp duties to 8.5% on properties worth more than HK $20 
million (US$2.6 million).
B:  Buyer’s Stamp Duty (BSD) was introduced on October 26, 2012. Non-Hong Kong 
permanent residents are required to pay a 15% tax on property purchases.
C:  In February 2013, the government doubled the stamp duty on all property transactions 
worth more than HK$2 million (US$257,902). This measure ended in May 2014.
D: In April 2013, the Residential Properties (First-hand Sales) Ordinance came into full effect.
Figure 1 Price Indices for Hong Kong Private Property Market
Source: (Based on the information by Rating and Valuation Department of Hong Kong, 
http://www.rvd.gov.hk/doc/en/statistics/graph2.pdf, date of access: March 9th, 2017)
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E:  In May 2014, the government proposed to relax the “six-month” timeframe for owners who 
wish to upgrade their flats. Homebuyers do not need to pay DSD if their old unit is sold 
within six months of signing a formal agreement.
F:  In February 2015, the need for lager down payments for buyers of self-used residential 
properties valued under HK$7 million (US$900,000) was introduced.
G:  In November 2016, the stamp duty on property transactions increased to 15% for the 2nd 
property, applying to all residential property acquisitions by individuals or companies.
However, notwithstanding the afore-mentioned measures, the housing price in the private 
sector continued to rise. Figure 2 shows the upward trend in house price together with the 
housing policy. The measures as identified by A to G are plotted in Figure 2 for ease of 
reference. It is commonly accepted that the cooling measures are not effective, as the demand 
for housing is evidently very strong. In addition to internal demand from Hong Kong 
residents, purchasers from Mainland China have further fueled the price bubble. Other than 
extra tax to be levied, overseas investors are free to purchase property in Hong Kong.
This study aims to examine whether competition is a contributor to the sharp rise in property 
price. The Hong Kong housing market is principally divided into two sectors; public and private. 
The public sector refers to the subsidized housing provided by the Government forlower income 
households. This sector is mostly rental and therefore not market driver. On the other hand, the 
price of new private residential units should respond to the supply and demand condition of 
the market. This study focuses on the private sector and is reported in six parts: I) the concepts 
of competition, II) the new private residential unit market in Hong Kong, III) measurement of 
concentration, IV) data analysis, V) discussions and suggestions and VI) concluding remarks.
Concepts of Competition
In traditional static economic analysis, welfare is assumed to be enhanced with competition 
intensity. Perfect competition is almost synchronous as welfare maximization (Audretsch, 
Baumol and Burke, 2001). Optimum competition would bring greater economic efficiency, 
including more effective use of resources and greater productivity gains for the economy, since 
market players are spurred to be more efficient, and innovative and responsive to consumer 
needs (HKCC, 2015a; Whish and Bailey, 2012).
Figure 2 Hong Kong Property Price Index (2010-2016) (Source: Centa-city index)
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In a market with de-monopolization, liberalization, and privatization, market players need 
to win consumers by offering lower prices and/or better products that will increase consumers’ 
welfare (Hussein, Manap and Nor, 2012). However, the presence of competition may also 
affect the equity consideration between market individuals. There are instances where an 
individual may single-handedly control the material payoff, thus affecting market outcomes, 
and creating an imperfect market competition (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
It has long been recognized that Hong Kong is one of the freest economies in the world (Chen 
and Lin, 2002; HKCC, 2015a). The Hong Kong government has adopted a laissez faire approach 
under which market forces inform resources allocation (Chen and Lin, 2002). However, laissez faire 
will not guarantee perfect competition (Chen and Lin, 2002). Anti-competition conducts such as 
price fixing and bid riggings have been reported in Hong Kong (HKCC, 2015a). Furthermore, 
unrestrained laissez faire economic policy does not encourage wealth distribution among citizens. 
In Hong Kong, Williams (2009) reported that about 25% of the population are officially 
recognized as being below the poverty line, while most of the remaining ones are on the borderline, 
with only a very small portion holding an overwhelming share of wealth. Therefore, in many 
developed economies, legislative intervention has been instigated to protect trades and engender 
competition. The earliest example of competition law can be traced back to Roman legislation 
around 50 BC (Wilberforce et al., 1966). Competition law in modern times began with the United 
States Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914 (Hovenkamp, 1988). By 1996, 22 of 
the 26 transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union had established 
competition laws (Dutz and Vagliasindi, 2000). By 1998, approximately 82 countries already had 
competition legislation (Chen and Lin, 2002). In Hong Kong, the first-ever competition law – the 
Hong Kong Competition Ordinance (HKCO) was enacted in June 2012. The HKCO has two 
conduct rules to regulate anti-competition conduct that prevents, restricts, or distorts competition 
in Hong Kong. The First Conduct Rule (FCR) regulates restrictive agreements while the Second 
Conduct Rule (SCR) prohibits abuses of substantial market power. In addition, the HKCO also 
has a merger rule to prohibit merges that substantially lessen competition.
The following HKCO SCR is relevant to this study:
“An undertaking that has a substantial degree of market power in a market must not 
abuse that power by engaging in conduct that has as its object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition in Hong Kong”
Possession of market power refers to situation where providers of goods or a service can 
consistently raise prices above the price level established by a competitive market (Alvarado, 
1998). Accumulation of market power is indicated by the concentration of resources in the hands 
of a few merchandise/service providers (Alvarado, 1998). Therefore, organizations with market 
power can affect either the price and supply quantity, or both, of their products/services. Abusive 
use of dominant market power could therefore significantly influence the level of competition 
of the market. What competition laws therefore seek to control is abusive use of market power. 
Under the HKCO, undertakings with substantial degree of market power therefore have a 
special responsibility not to engage in conducts that harm competition (HKCC, 2015b).
Guidelines of competition laws of different jurisdictions have suggested ways to identify the 
existence of dominant market power. Table 1 summarizes the guidelines used in Singapore, Malaysia, 
UK, Australia, Europe, and US. Market share is the most commonly used indicator. As such, market 
share higher than 40% to 60% of an undertaking is likely to be considered as having dominant 
market power. Furthermore, other indicators such as entry barrier and consumers’ bargaining power 
are also considered in most jurisdictions. The afore-listed indicators are not exhaustive.
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Like the Guidelines summarised in Table 1, the Guideline on the Second Conduct Rule 
(GSCR) of the HKCO suggests the use of a) market share and market concentration; b) 
potential entry or expansion; and c) countervailing buyer power, to evaluate whether an 
undertaking has a substantial degree of market power (HKCC, 2015b).
The New Private Resident Unit Market in Hong Kong
Competition affects supply and thus the price of a commodity. Private residential unit 
(PRN) in Hong Kong is a type of commodity. Inadequate supply has been identified as 
one of the triggers of the high property price in Hong Kong. In 1996, the Hong Kong 
Consumer Council firstly raised this issue and reported that the Hong Kong private 
residential property market was quite concentrated (HKCC, 1996). The objective of 
this study is to measure the concentration of the New Private Residential Unit Market 
(NPRUM) to evaluate the level of competition in that market. The concepts embedded 
in the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance on market concentration are used for this study.
a) Market share and market concentration
Market share distribution reflects the extent to which market power is distributed among 
incumbents (Adelman, 1951; Ye, Lu and Jiang, 2009). Measurement of concentration is a 
principal way to evaluate the relative power of the market players and is instrumental to gauge 
the intensity of competition (Adelman, 1951; Willekens and Achmadi, 2003). In this regard, the 
GSCR suggests the use of market share as the initial screening device in assessing market power. 
In general, a higher market share suggests greater market power. The issue of competition is more 
acute where the number of suppliers is limited and barrier to entry is high (McCloughan, 2004; 
McCloughan and Abounoori, 2003). The use of concentration measures to gauge competition 
level is based on the proposition that a highly concentrated market is characterized by dominance 
by a few large firms. A concentrated market is fertile for the abuse of market power that is most 
competition policies aim to curtail (McCloughan, 2004; McCloughan and Abounoori, 2003).
The DGSCR suggests two methods to measure market concentration; i) Concentration 
Ratios (CR) and ii) Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). CR focuses on the market share of the 
leading market participants while HHI weights the share of all participants to show inequality in 
market share distribution. More details on these two measures are given in the next section.
b) Potential Entry or Expansion
Barriers to entry may arise from a variety of sources (HKCC, 2015a). For example, structural 
barriers are those inherent in the market and examples include sunk cost, network effects 
and economics of scale. Strategic barriers are those intentionally created by incumbent 
undertakings like brand proliferation and product diversification. Barriers to entry have a large 
impact on competition. In general, market players holding dominant positions would not 
be shaken by new entries if the barrier is high. On the other hand, lowering barriers would 
encourage potential market entrants thus providing a counter force against monopoly pricing 
through competition (Heflebower, 1957). The characteristic features of the Hong Kong land 
supply system are discussed in the section on Discussion and Suggestions. This may explain 
how it might have worked as a barrier to entry.
c) Countervailing buyer power
Countervailing buyer power is the strength of buyers to freely choose among alternative 
suppliers (HKCC, 2015a) and is likely to exist when buyers could switch substantial purchases 
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between suppliers with little cost. Usually countervailing buyer power is stronger with the 
availability of alternatives and/or substitutes. On the other hand, abusive use of market power 
by dominant market holders can stifle countervailing buyer power.
MEASUREMENT OF CONCENTRATION
Concentration Ratio (CR) and Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) are the two most 
commonly used to measure concentration. CR is commonly used to denote the concentration 
of production management within an industry whereas HHI is commonly adopted to reflect 
market structure and the corresponding industry (Pulaj and Kume, 2013). CR and HHI have 
recently been used in assessing market concentration of the construction industry. For example, 
both CR4 and HHI methods were applied to prove the construction industry in Vlora region 
in Albania is not concentrated (Pulaj and Kume, 2013). More recently, CR and HHI have also 
been applied to evaluate competition in Hong Kong’s Ten Mega Project program (Cheung 
and Shen 2016).
As far as the HKCO is concerned, the GSCR suggests the use of both CR and HHI to 
measure market power. Therefore, it is advisable to use CR and HHI in this study to enhance 
the interpretation and evaluation and findings. A brief account on CR and HHI follows.
CONCENTRATION RATIO (CR)
Concentration Ratio (CR) is the most widely used measure of industrial concentration. CR 
is represented by the percentage of the market share occupied by the largest firms in a certain 
industry (Parker, 1991). For example, CR was used to indicate the market power and level of 
competition of the Belgian audit market (Willekens and Achmadi, 2003).
In terms of operation, CRn represents the market share occupied by the biggest n firms of 
that market. Pearcy and Calkin (1983) suggested the use of four-firm concentration ratio (Hall 
and Tideman, 1967; McCloughan, 2004; McCloughan and Abounoori, 2003). Furthermore, 
when market share of individual firms is not available, CR could be estimated by grouped 
data (McCloughan and Abounoori, 2003). As for the threshold and the corresponding 
interpretation, Baldwin and Gorecki (1994) proposed that CR4 above 75% indicates high 
probability of having a “competition problem”. In addition, McCloughan (2004) proposed that 
a CR5 higher than 70% denotes a highly-concentrated market and a CR5 less than 10% signals 
a highly-fragmented market.
HIRFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX (HHI)
Although CR is commonly used for ease of understanding, nevertheless it has also been 
criticized for the narrow focus on a few large firms (Ye, Lu and Jiang, 2009). As such, HHI 
has been proposed to measure concentration of control over a corporation, a market or 
foreign trade (Hirschman, 1980). HHI is the sum of the squared market shares of the top 50 
firms (or all the firms if they are less than fifty) in a sector (Chiang, Tang and Leung, 2001; 
Nawrocki and Carter, 2010; Ye, Lu and Jiang, 2009). When Hirschman (1980) developed this 
index to measure concentration, it had been stressed that an important condition of perfect 
competition implies the presence of both a relatively equal market share by many producing 
firms. Unlike CR, all participants in that market are considered in the calculation of HHI. 
Besides, HHI weights each firm by its own relative market share, giving higher weights 
to larger firms. HHI has been adopted as a formal numerical index in U.S. Department of 
Justice Merger Guidelines since 1982, as an indicator of competition (Rhoades, 1993).
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Data Analysis
For the NPRM, annual Gross Floor Area (GFA) of building production is used to denote 
the market share condition in this study. GFA is defined as the area contained within the 
external walls of the building measured at each floor level (Buildings Department, 2016). 
GFA Production is another way to represent the output of developers. In addition, the annual 
completion in GFA is generally available in the annual report of all listed companies and 
therefore used in this study.
To evaluate the concentration status of NPRM, developers listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange are ranked by their market capitalisation. Table 2 summarizes the top 9 developers 
by net capital value. However, not all of them are active in providing new private residential 
units. As a result, only 5 developers (A, D, E, F, and G) who are active in NPRM are included 
in this study. Studying these developers’ annual reports of 2012 to 2015, the market shares are 
computed by comparing their respective annual GFA Completions of residential development 
GFA to the total completion figure obtained from the Key Statistics on Business Performance 
and Operating Characteristics of the Building, Construction and Real Estate Sectors by 
Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong.
To analyse entry barrier, the land sale records in Hong Kong from financial year 2011/2012 
to 2014/2015 were retrieved from the Hong Kong Lands Department website. The developers’ 
land banks were collected from their respective annual reports.
The calculation of CR and HHI for 2012 is detailed as demonstration. CRs and HHIs for 
2013, 2014 and 2015 are calculated similarly.
Table 2 Top property developers listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
Company Name Range of Operation Market Capitalisation as 
shown in 2015 annual 
report (million HKD)
A property development
property investment
property related business
telecommunications
infrastructure
456,818
B property development
property investment
property management
340,859
C property development
property investment
property related business
317,180
D property development
property related business
infrastructure
315,060
E property development
property investment
hotel and serviced suite operation
269,587
Table 2 continues on next page
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a) Calculation of Concentration Ratio (CR)
The range of concentration ratio is from 0 to 1, with close to zero indicating that the market is 
perfectly competitive and one indicates a monopoly (Hill, 1987; Parker, 1991; Rosenbluth, 1955; 
Ye, Lu and Jiang, 2009). The calculation of CR can be conducted by the following formula:
 ∑
=
CR Sn ii 1
k
where Si denotes the market share of firm i and k denotes the total number of firms whose 
market shares are included. For purposes of completeness and enhancing interpretation of 
findings, CR3, CR4 and CR5 are used in this study.
1) Individual market share (S1 to S5)
)
)
(
(S =
3645000  ft
10775945 ft = 33.83%1
2
2
)
)
(
(= =S
2266759 ft
10775945 ft 21.04%2
2
2
)
)
(
(= =S
1559149  ft
10775945 ft 14.47%3
2
2
)
)
(
(= =S
535892 ft
10775945 ft 4.97%4
2
2
Table 2 (Continued)
Company Name Range of Operation Market Capitalisation as 
shown in 2015 annual 
report (million HKD)
F land reserve
property development
property investment
260,108
G property development
property investment
property management
251,297
H property development
property investment
land reserve
property management
129,946
I property development
property investment
property related business
property management
30,580
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)
)
(
(= =S
465266  ft
10775945 ft 4.32%5
2
2
2) Concentration Ratio (CR3, CR4, CR5)
CR3 = ∑ Sii=13  = S1 + S2 + S3 = 33.83% + 21.04% + 14.47% = 69.34%
CR4 = ∑
=
Sii 1
4  = CR3 + S4 = 69.34% + 4.97% = 74.31%
CR5 = ∑ Sii=15  = CR4 + S5 = 74.31% + 4.32% = 78.63%
Table 3 summarizes the concentration ratios of the big five listed developers in Hong Kong 
for the period together with the possible thresholds that may be used by the Hong Kong 
Competition Commission.
b) Calculation of Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. 
It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a market, and then 
summing the resulting numbers, and can range from close to zero to 10,000. If, for example, 
there were only one firm in an industry, that firm would have 100% market share, and the HHI 
would equal 10,000, indicating a monopoly. If, there were thousands of firms competing, each 
would have nearly 0% market share, and the HHI would be close to zero, indicating nearly 
perfect competition (Chiang, Tang and Leung, 2001; Nawrocki and Carter, 2010). In the 
following formula, Si and Sk have the same denotations as they do in the CR formula.
∑HHI = Si2i=13
Since HHI outcomes are compared against the threshold index suggested in Merger 
Guidelines of U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and other 
studies (Cardell, Hitt and Hogan, 1997; Kerber, Kretschmer and von Wangenheim, 2009) that 
follow the index format convention in the Merger Guidelines, percent sign (%) is left out for 
both Si and HHI expressions. For example, S1 is expressed as 33.83 rather than 33.83%.
Table 3 CRs of the NPRUM in Hong Kong for the Top Listed Developers 
CR3
(57.94)
CR4
(66.20)
CR5
(72.25)
CR Thresholds
Singapore (60%) ¸ ¸
Malaysia (60%) ¸ ¸
UK (50%) ¸ ¸ ¸
Europe (40%) ¸ ¸ ¸
US (sustainably over 40%) ¸ ¸ ¸
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Reservation in using HHI is the difficulty in collecting data of every single firm in the market 
(Adelman, 1951). In this regard, Hirschman (1980) suggested that where data of most large 
firms are predominant, the remaining few can be lumped as “other firms”. As a result, an 
approximate determination could be made by setting a maximum and a minimum limit to the 
remaining firms (Hirschman, 1980).
1) Squared market share for top-5 firms (S12 to S52)
S12 = 33.83 × 33.83 = 1144.47
S22 = 21.04 × 21.04 = 442.68
S32 = 14.47 × 14.47 = 209.38
S42 = 4.97 × 4.97 = 24.70
S52 = 4.32 × 4.32 = 18.66
2) Upper limit for the remaining firms
Contributions of the rest of firms’ market shares (HHIr) toward HHI are taken into 
consideration using an upper limit and a lower limit suggested by Hirschman (1945). Since  
the top-5 firms are holding the largest market shares ranked from 1st to 5th, any of the 
remaining firm would have a market share no larger than S5 (4.32). As a higher HHI suggest  
a more concentrated market, HHImax could be achieved when S6 occupies the same amount  
of S5, and so does S7, S8 until Sx when ∑ =
=
S 100ii 1
x .
In this case,
∑ S =78.62ii=15 ,
and 100 78.62
4.32 4.95
−
= ,
HHImax can be achieved when assuming there are 3 firms whose market shares S6 = S7 = S8 = 
4.32, and another firm S9 = 100 - 78.62 - 4.32 × 3 = 8.42. At this extreme situation, firms1 to 9 
have all market shares while the other firms have no market share.
HHImax = ∑
=
Si2i 1
9  S12 + S22 + S32 + S42 + S52 + S62 + S72 + S82 + S92 = 1144.47 + 442.68 + 
209.38 + 24.70 + 18.66 + 18.66 + 18.66 + 18.66 + 70.90 = 1967
3) Lower limit for the remaining firms
The lower limit considering the remaining firms’ market shares could be achieved when all 
remaining firms equally share the market (Hirschman 1945).
HHImin = S12 + S22 + S32 + S42 + S52 ∑ − = 100 78.62n
2
i 6
n ,
where n is the total number of market participants. It is not easy to determine the 
exact number of market participants in the NPRUM since not all developers are listed. 
Notwithstanding, the major ones are all listed without a definitive value of n, and thus the 
lower limit for the remaining firms is therefore adopted.
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∑ −  >= 100 78.62n 0
2
i 6
n
So HHImin > S12 + S22 + S32 + S42 + S52 = 1840
The HHI of 2012 NPRUM is between 1967 and 1840.
Findings
Applying the calculation method presented in the preceding section, the data on market share 
of the five major developers are shown in Table 4. HHI is shown within a range in between 
HHImax and HHImin.
CR4 and CR5 are compared against the thresholds used in the competition guidelines listed 
in Table 4. For example, the EU guidelines consider market share under 40% as “unlikely” to 
be dominant. Goyder (2003) reported that the European Commission considers 50% or more 
market share as having a dominant position. The values of CR4 and CR5 from 2012 to 2015 
all exceed 50%, meaning the top-4 and top-5 firms have collective dominance in the NPRUM 
in Hong Kong. The CR5 of year 2012 is almost 80% suggesting a “super-dominant” position. 
Goyder (2003) pointed out that in such situation, the top five firms shall have a special 
responsibility not to indulge in abusive behaviours. The guidelines of UK Competition Act 
1998 and the US Sherman Antitrust Act 1890 both suggest 50% as the threshold of dominant 
power. The Singapore Competition Act 2004 and Laws of Malaysia Act 712 Competition 
Act 2010 set 60% as the threshold. Thus, in the light of these thresholds, CR5 suggest that the 
largest 5 developers in the Hong Kong NPRUM are collectively holding a dominant market 
position. These countries are studied because the thresholds they used are considered by the 
Hong Kong Competition Commission.
Figure 3 Cumulative Market Share of Big 5 listed Developers
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Table 5 gives the CR threshold commonly used. Table 6 shows the HHI threshold used in 
the U.S. Merger Guideline in 1992 and 2010. Both versions are listed to indicate the changes 
instigated to respond to the changes in business module.
With CR4, the NPRUM is marginally less concentrated than that of CR5. These figures again 
flag potential competition issues (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1994; McCloughan, 2004). It is further 
noted that there is a declining trend of CR4 and CR5 from 2012 to 2015. The upward shift of 
HHIs suggest the rising trend of having larger firms that hold substantial market shares.
Taking the US guideline as a reference, HHI steadily stayed as moderately 
concentrated when the 1992 version is applied. If the 2010 version is applied, the HHI values 
suggest the market is “non-concentrated”. Unlike high CRs that have shown that market 
shares are significantly concentrated in the largest 5 developers, HHI demonstrated the 
competition condition of the NPRUM from another perspective. The squaring mechanism 
of HHI places more focus to the individual market shares. Although the total market share 
of the five developers is large in absolute value, their shares are quite evenly spread, especially 
among the top three. HHI of firms that have equal market share distribution is lower than 
for an uneven distribution. In this respect, the HHI assessment and CR analysis are in fact 
complementary. When CR analyses demonstrate that the top-3 to top-5 firms are holding 
a dominant position in the NPRUM, HHI analyses show that within the dominant group 
there is no single dominant firm (Figure 3). These results are discussed in the light of the 
characteristics of the land supply market in the next section.
Table 5 CR Thresholds as Screening Tools
Region Legislations Suggested Threshold
Singa-
pore
Competition Act 2004 >60%
Malaysia Laws of Malaysia Act 712 Competition Act 
2010
>60%
UK Competition Act 1998 >50%
Australia Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (No threshold sugges-
ted)
Europe Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union
<40% not likely dom-
inant
US The Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) >50% and sustainable 
over time
Table 6 HHI Thresholds as Screening Tools
Version 2010 1992
US Horizontal Merger 
Guideline
Non-concentrated Under 1500 Under 1000
Moderately concentrated 1500 - 2500 1000 - 1800
Highly concentrated Over 2500 Over 1800
Cheung, Levina & Niu
Construction Economics and Building,  Vol. 17, No. 2  June 201716
Discussions and Suggestions
This section first dicusses the land supply system in Hong Kong.
a) Land Sale System
In Hong Kong, the Lands Department administers land disposal, which determines specified 
amounts of land for sales each year. These lands are disposed on a leasehold basis, where 
government retains the right to the land while developers can develop, use, transfer, and 
benefit from the land on lease.
The land leases are disposed either through land auctions, public tenders, application list 
and private treaty grants. Land Sale had been primarily through government land auction and 
tender before 1999, where list of specific sites was put up by the government for sale according 
to a timetable prepared by the Lands Department (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2006).
The Application List System was introduced in 1999 as another option and became the sole 
way to acquire government land from 2004 to 2011. Furthermore, an upper limit of 50 acres 
had been implemented for the period of 1984 to 1997. Under the Application List System, 
Lands Department provided a list of sites for sale. A developer could proactively apply to 
the Lands Department with a bidding price if interested in any of the listed sites. The price 
submitted was guaranteed as the “minimum” bidding price, and if considered acceptable to the 
government, the site put on sale for auction or open tender (Legislative Council Secretariat, 
2006). In effect, the Application List System narrows the sites on sale down to those being 
targeted by potential buyers. The system is passive and there will be no sale if no submission 
of interest is received. This system was in operation from 2004 to 2011 during which the total 
number of land packages leased out for residential use were less than 10 each year (Figure 4) 
and the property price continued to rise while developers refrained from making applications.
The Application List System is considered as one of the prime drivers of property price escalation. 
From 2010, the Hong Kong government reverted to public tender and auction, along with the 
Application List System. The transaction numbers started to increase and have been maintained 
above 20 per year since 2012 (Figure 4). The reuse of public tender and public auction successfully 
re-energised residential land supply, with many medium and small sized developers joining the 
market. More recently, there has been a strong participation of developers from Mainland China.
Figure 4 Hong Kong Government Annual Land Disposal (Residential)
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The land sale mechanism by the Application List System was abolished in 2014. The 
government regularly provides land for sale to ensure supply for housing developments since 
2014. The effect on the volume of land sales is quite apparent. In 2016, there were 17 lots sold 
for residential developers (Lands Department, 2016).
It is worth noting that from 2011 to 2013 when open public sale was restored, the land 
acquired by the “Big 5” developers has also gradually risen from 5% per year to 14% percent 
per year by area (Figure 4), thus reconfirming the active status of the “Big 5” in the NPRUM.
b) Land Bank
Strategic land purchase and selling of the built units at the right time, are crucial for property 
developers (Barlow, 1993). The investment on property development is irreversible, so that 
developers would assume greater risks if they cannot sell the units to realise profits (Titman, 
1985). Land bank can serve as a buffer for developers against risk until they acquire enough 
information to decide an optimum time for development (Raymond, 1998). Major developers 
have acquired substantial land reserves and are identified as land banks in this study.
In Hong Kong, agricultural land is a major land bank source. With rapid urbanization, large 
areas of former farm land have been abandoned and lain idle for a long period. The “Big 5” have 
been acquiring substantial agricultural land from residents in the New Territories to build up 
their land reserves (Figure 5 refers). These lands could be used for future residential development 
through lease modification (Hui, 2004). Based on the Hong Kong Planning Standards and 
Guidelines, the maximum domestic plot ratio imposed in the case of lease modifications is 5 
for R2 type and 3 for R3 type of residential development. Assuming the “Big 5” would convert 
their land bank of agricultural land for residential unit developments, the total GFA that could 
be provided will add up to over 90 million ft2. When developers apply for conversion of land 
usage, they would have to pay an appropriate premium to be agreed with the government. Poon 
(2011) describes the process for rezoning land from agricultural to residential in Hong Kong as 
“simple”. When developers negotiate with the government to determine the premium, there is 
no competition as there is in public tender or auction.
Figure 5 Land bank
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337.125
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Total Land Bank of Top 5 Developers
Government Land Bank
"Big 5"'s land bank compared with government available 
land for residenal development
Agricultural Development Government
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The Hong Kong Development Bureau reported that the land reserved for residential 
use in Hong Kong was no more than 391.5 hectares, within which there are irregular-
shaped lots that might not be suitable for residential development (Hong Kong SAR 
Development Bureau, 2013). These lands are in Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and New 
Territories. Based on Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines, the maximum 
domestic plot ratios range from 3 to 10. Optimistically assuming a plot ratio of 8 for all 
government land, it can provide 337 million ft2 GFA. It can be seen from Figure 5 and 
Table 7 that the sum of land bank and agricultural land bank of the “Big 5” amounts to 
over 60% of the government’s total.
The absorption of land supply into land bank has not only raised the entry barrier to the 
NPRUM but also interferes with the operation of market. In early 2013, the Development 
Bureau reported that among 52 residential sites leased out from 2011 to 2013, there 
were only 6 projects granted consent to commence building works and others remaining 
undeveloped. The reply of the government highlighted that under the Building Covenant, 
residential developments are supposed to begin from 48 to 72 months from obtaining the 
lease, during which time they could prepare plans and submit applications for relevant 
approvals. However, it also mentioned that the Building Covenant period (BC period) 
can be extended if the property owners make applications and if such application could be 
justified by the Lands Department. It can be summarised that from both regulatory and 
structural aspects, the land sale system and land bank may have created barriers against 
potential entrants.
This study provides an application of the Second Conduct Rule by employing the 
concentration measures suggested in the HKCO GSCR to evaluate the market power 
of key players of the NPRUM. This study found that no single market player in that 
market has overwhelming power. Although the top 5 listed developers have a collective 
dominance, their respective shares are quite close. Nonetheless, up to the year 2015, the 
biggest five developers collectively held over 60% of the market share. The possibility 
that there has been, or will be, any misuse of dominant market power would be another 
interesting study.
LIMITATIONS
Firstly, the findings are to be read with the caveats that not all residential property developers are 
listed. Nonetheless, the most active developers of the NPRUM have been included in this study. 
Secondly, the plot ratios used for future land use are based on assumption that the agricultural land 
banks of the “Big 5” will be converted to residential use in the future. Thirdly, this study employs 
the two major indicators of market power suggested by the GCSR (Hong Kong Competition 
Table 7 Government Land bank and Developer’s Land Bank (as at June 2014)
 Land Bank
(million ft2)
Agricultural Land 
Bank
(million ft2)
Total Land Bank
(million ft2)
Government
Land Bank
(million ft2)
Top 5 
 Developers
117.3 90.8 208.1 337.125
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Commission, 2015). Thus, CR and HHI should be read together with other indicators such as 
buyers’ countervailing power and regulatory framework imposed. Specifically, this study highlighted 
the application list mechanism used in Hong Kong and the potential impact.
Conclusion
The new residential property price in Hong Kong has rocketed in the last decade and has 
been ranked within the top three metropolitan cities in the world. The rise after the 2008 
global financial turmoil has been phenomenal and far beyond inflation. The concentration 
of this market had been suspected to be high, which raised the issue of competition. This 
study investigates this issue. The Guidelines of the Second Conduct Rule of the Hong Kong 
Competition Ordinance suggest the use of Concentration Ratio (CR) and Hirfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) to evaluate the concentration level of a market. Accordingly, CR and 
HHI of the NPRM are calculated. The result suggests that the NPRM is quite concentrated. 
For the period from 2012 to 2015, the big five developers in Hong Kong collectively held a 
dominant position of the potential supply. It is further noted that the top three providers have 
very close market shares. As such there is no single monopoly. Regarding the commonly used 
thresholds, the NPRM in Hong Kong is considered moderately concentrated. In analysing 
barriers to entry, the land application system used in Hong Kong after the Asia financial 
turmoil in 2008 had limited the land supply, thus has indirectly lead to a concentrated market. 
Recently, to unleash the supply market, the Hong Kong Government has reactivated public 
land auctions to replace the land application mechanism. Lots of smaller lots are also being 
made available. With these, the supply of new private residential units is expected to rise. 
A lowering trend of concentration is noted from 2012 to 2015. Moreover, the substantial land 
banks of big listed developers, coupled with significant firm scale and sunk cost, will enable 
the big developers to continue to hold a collective dominant position.
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